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444 Summary
The global fi nancial crisis has affected the Croatian local public sector. In such 
circumstances, local government units’ debts and borrowing should be approa-
ched with caution. The highly interwoven fi nancial operations of local govern-
ment units and their utilities indicate the need for analysis of consolidated fi nan-
cial statements of local governments and utility companies in order to gain an 
insight into the real fi nancial “health” of local units. Accordingly, the main aim of 
this paper is to analyze the size and the structure of the consolidated (local gover-
nment and utility companies) local public debt in Croatia. Accordingly, the paper 
presents the fi nancial position of local government units supplemented with infor-
mation on the fi nancial operations of utility companies, with particular emphasis 
on the size and structure of their liabilities and gross and net debt. Although the 
current Budget Law does not require formal preparation of consolidated fi nancial 
statements by local governments and their utility fi rms, consolidation is stipulated 
by International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). The application of 
IPSAS regulations would be helpful in determining overall direct and indirect 
exposure of local government units arising from the fi nancial operations of their 
utilities.
Keywords: local government units’ debts, utility companies’ debts, the consolida-
tion of fi nancial statements of local units and utility companies, Croatia
1 INTRODUCTION
The consequences of the fi nancial crisis lasting since 2007 still to a great extent 
determine world fi nancial and economic fl ows. In the post-crisis period, the resu-
lts of the spillover of negative fi nancial fl ows onto the economy are becoming 
ever more patent, the ultimate result ever more frequently being political instabi-
lity in some countries. Potential creditors, in the new circumstances, are very 
sceptical, and the refi nancing of existing debts with new borrowings is becoming 
increasingly diffi cult. The public fi nances of most countries have deteriorated, 
bringing about a reduction in the credit rating, which considerably exacerbates the 
situation. Accordingly, management of the public debt acquires additional impor-
tance. Along with the direct debt – created by the issue of bonds and by taking on 
loans – an increasing subject of interest is the indirect debt deriving from contin-
gent liabilities. 
The debt of units of local self-government1 even in these turbulent times can har-
dly constitute a threat to the sustainability of public fi nances (according to Euro-
stat fi gures, local government debt in the EU ranges between 0.1 and 8.5% of 
GDP). Nevertheless, uncontrolled growth of local unit liabilities can have a con-
siderable effect on their liquidity and indirectly on the fi scal sustainability of the 
local and overall public sector. In order for there to be a quality management of 
local public debt, particular attention needs to be directed to contingent obliga-
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445tions the materialisation of which is unpredictable and which are, precisely bec-
ause of their uncertainty, totally neglected. Several research works have already 
been carried out in Croatia (Bajo, 1998; 2004; 2007; 2008 and Bajo and Primorac, 
2009; 2010a) drawing attention to the importance of managing the contingent 
liabilities of local units. These investigations analyse in detail, from an empirical 
aspect, the trends and structure of contingent liabilities and show the importance 
of the expansion of their scope to the debt of the utility fi rms – which is particu-
larly relevant with the growth of utility fi rm insolvency (Bajo and Primorac, 
2010b) and the expected diffi culties in the re-fi nancing of existing debts.
Although theoretical and empirical research into this problem area is quite mea-
gre, the reasons for and consequences of the supply of local public services via 
fi rms owned by the local units started being researched into in the USA in the 
middle of the last century. The motif for this research was simple – a large part of 
total revenue of local units in the USA referred at that time to the profi t of the 
utility fi rms (DiLorenzo, 1982). Colberg (1955) thus in the fi fties studied the mea-
sure to which the fi nancing of local units by taxation of assets was replaced by 
fi nancing via the utility fi rms. The author also raised the question of the justifi ca-
tion for the accumulation of profi t on the part of the utility fi rms, which was not in 
line with the principle of setting the price of public services according to the 
amount of their marginal costs and the fi nancing of local units by the profi t of the 
utility fi rms was just another means of concealed taxation (because of the appa-
rently lower price of public services). Strauss and Wertz (1976) studied the con-
nection between local taxes and the profi ts of utility fi rms and showed that the 
profi t of the fi rms was a substitute for local units’ own revenues. DiLorenzo (1982) 
expanded the Colberg (1955) hypothesis of the impact of the fi nancing of local 
units via utility fi rms on the perception of the price of local public services and 
showed that the increase in the share of the profi t of utilities in the local revenues 
resulted in a growth of local expenses – which is opposite to the fi ndings of empi-
rical research (Strauss and Wertz, 1976). Finally, De Hoog and Swanson (1988) 
deny there is any kind of impact from the fi nancing of local units by the profi ts of 
utility fi rms on local expenditure and own revenue (assets taxes), confi rming that 
there is no consensus on the kind and intensity of the interdependence of their fi -
nancial operations.
Apart from that, DeHoog and Swanson (1988) reveal new aspects of the infl uence 
of the operations of utility fi rms on local units in the context of the fi scal crisis of 
the cities that shook the USA during the 1970s and say that utility fi rms can in 
turbulent times suck local budgets dry if the amount of user charges do not enable 
them fi scal self-suffi ciency. Rubin (1988) studies the political implications of the 
foundation of utility fi rms and their impact on the budget of the local units and 
also discusses the relevance of the statement about the use of utility fi rms to avoid 
restrictions on the size of the revenue, spending and borrowing of local units, 
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446 restrictions on the taxation and spending of local units because of the transfer of a 
large part of public activities to extra-budgetary (utility) fi rms. These fi rms are 
fi nanced by user charges and revenue bonds without the guarantees of local units 
that do not need the support of the electorate. Although in theory independent, the 
extra-budgetary fi rms are generously subsidized from local budgets.2 Subsidies 
are a hidden tax liability, and borrowing and spending of the extra-budgetary fi rms 
to a great extent drive out private consumption and investment. The authors em-
phasise that one of the basic reasons for the foundation of utility fi rms in the USA 
was to sidestep the fairly restrictive fi scal restrictions on the borrowing of local 
units. In answer to the comment on this work of Blewett (1984), Bennett and Di-
Lorenzo (1984) give additional support to statements about the basic reasons for 
the founding of local unit utility fi rms that include avoidance of voter control and 
the creation of an opaque mechanism of defi cit fi nancing. The said fi rms (say the 
authors) often fi nance not only capital investment but also existing debts and ope-
rational costs, which is ineffi cient and not in accordance with the principle of be-
nefi ts achieved, and also brings into question inter-generational equity.3
The objective of this paper is to analyse the debts of local units and utilities in 
Croatia. It is divided into six parts. After the introduction comes the second part in 
which the interrelationship of the fi nancial operations of local units and utilities is 
described. Part three is devoted to an analysis of the fi nancial position of local 
units and utilities and to a testing of the quality of fi nancial operations, solvency, 
indebtedness, the burden of debt and debt servicing of the local sector debt. Gross 
debt and net debt are dealt with in the fourth part, while the fi fth part of the paper 
studies the market aspects of debt. Some conclusions and recommendations are 
advanced in part six of the paper.
2  THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE FINANCIAL OPERATIONS 
OF LOCAL UNITS AND UTILITY FIRMS
Thanks to the accelerated process of urbanisation, investments in capital infra-
structure have become an important element in the improvement of the quality of 
life of the populations of local units and a key prerequisite for economic growth. 
In line with the rise in the standard of living of the population, the need for increa-
sed quality and diversity in the supply of the public services of local units also 
rises. Local units in Croatia often confi de the supply of a certain segment of public 
services (utilities) to separate legal entities (utility fi rms) that they on the whole 
control via their share in equity. Utilities as defi ned by the Municipal Economy 
[Utility] Law (NN 26/03) are drinking water supply, waste water drainage and 
treatment, gas supply, thermal energy supply, mass transit, hygiene and cleansing, 
disposal of household waste, maintenance of public areas, maintenance of unclas-
sifi ed roads, retail markets, maintenance of cemeteries and crematoria, perfor-
2 Politicians have always attempted to hide the size of subsidies to utility firms; in 1962 Governor Rockefel-
ler had the accounting laws in the state of New York changed so that subsidies to utilities be excluded from 
the budget.
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447mance of funeral services, chimney sweeping services and street lighting. These 
utility services can be carried out by a company, a public institution and a service 
founded by a local unit and also by a legal or natural entity on the basis of a con-
cession contract or a contract confi ding such utility activities to an entity. Funding 
for the performance of utility activities is provided from the price of utility servi-
ces, utility charges, the budget of the local unit and other sources according to 
separate regulations. A look at the structure of shares and equities presented in the 
balance sheets (table 1) shows the intensity of public unit ownership of public 
sector companies.
TABLE 1
Shares and equities of local units – inland (in million kuna)






















(1+2+3+4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
20
08
Cities 11,441 1 9,927 46 1,466
Municipalities 1,720 5 1,434 31 250
Counties 635 0 290 0 345
Total 13,796 6 11,651 77 2,061
20
09
Cities 11,731 1 10,022 47 1,661
Municipalities 1,931 2 1,632 37 260
Counties 638 0 302 0 336
Total 14,300 2 11,957 84 2,257
Source: Author, on the basis of financial reports of local units for 2008 and 2009.
The total bookkeeping value of shares and equities that local units have in other 
economic operators rose from 13.8 billion kuna in 2008 to 14.3 billion kuna in 
2009, the structure (accounting for about 85%) being dominated by shares and 
equities in public sector companies. The structure of the equity portfolio of local 
units shows the potential interdependence of the fi nancial operations of local units 
and utility fi rms. This statement can be verifi ed by a review of subsidies and capi-
tal assistance of local units to public sector companies.
The total amount of subsidies of local units to companies in the public sector in-
creased in the observed period from 1.06 to 1.15 billion kuna, the biggest part of 
the subsides being received by utility fi rms from the cities (over 95%). The amount 
of capital assistance in the same period reduced and the total amount of assistance 
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448 In order to obtain an overview of the scale of the fi nancing of utilities with the 
budgetary resources of local units, it is useful to consider the proportion of reve-
nue from grants and subsidies in the operational revenue of the utility fi rms using 
the example of the fi rms of Zagrebački holding d.o.o. 
TABLE 2
Subsidies and capital aid of local units to public sector companies 
(in million kuna)
Cities Municipalities Counties Total
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Subsidies 1,010 1,102 37 38 10 10 1,057 1,150
Capital assistance 58 32 23 18 179 133 260 182
Total 1,069 1,134 60 56 188 143 1,317 1,333
Source: Author, on the basis of financial reports of local units for 2008 and 2009.
TABLE 3
Operating revenue of utility fi rms (in million kuna)
 2008 2009
Total operating revenue of utility fi rms (UF) 9,058 9,200
Operating revenue of Zagrebački holding d.o.o. (ZGH) 3,886 4,343
Subsidies to public sector fi rms (PS) 1,057 1,150
Revenue from grants and subsidies ZGH 805 852
Subsidies to PS fi rms in operating revenues of UF (%) 11.7 12.5
Grants and subsidies in operating revenue of ZGH (%) 20.7 19.6
NB: For the necessity of analysis (because data are unavailable) it is assumed that all the 
subsidies to companies in the public sector are received by utility firms, which probably is not 
entirely accurate. Still the assumption is fairly relevant since in 2009 ZGH alone took 74% of 
the total amount.
Source: Author, on the basis of consolidated financial reports of firms of Zagrebački holding 
d.o.o. for 2009 and the financial reports of local units for 2008 and 2009.
Total operational revenues of the consolidated utility sector (all the utilities to-
gether) came in 2008 to a bit more than 9 billion kuna (table 3), over 1 billion kuna 
of operating revenue relating to subsidies that are on the whole recorded at the 
position other operational revenue. A similar structure of operational revenues is 
observable in 2009 as well. The fi rm Zagrebački holding d.o.o. is by far the big-
gest utility fi rm in Croatia, and its operations need devoting extra attention. The 
operational revenue of ZH in 2009 exceed 47% of total operating revenue of all 
other utilities put together, and its operations in the same year were assisted with 
74% of the total amount of grants and subsidies of local units to utility fi rms. Re-
venue from grants and subsidies of the fi rm Zagrebački holding d.o.o. are to a very 
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449the budget of the city for purposes approved by the Assembly4 as well as fi nancial 
aid for debt servicing (principle, interest, charges). 
The interdependence of the fi nancial operations of local units and utility fi rms is 
additionally confi rmed by the fact that grants and subsidies from the budgets of 
local units make up over 10% of the operational revenue of the utility fi rms, with 
a perceptible trend to a further increase of this share.
2.1 BORROWING OF LOCAL UNITS AND UTILITY FIRMS
After an analysis of the interrelation of the fi nancial operations of local units and 
utility fi rms and an indisputable connection and indeed dependence of utility fi rms 
on transfers from the budgets of local units has been proved, the question arises as 
to the infl uence of the fi nancial operations of utility fi rms on the fi nancial health 
of local units (particularly in the borrowing context). Accordingly, below there 
will fi rst be an interpretation of the legislative background for the borrowing of 
local units and utility fi rms, after which empirical research into the potential ef-
fects of the fi nancial operations of the utility fi rms on the fi nancial stability of the 
entire local public sector will be conducted. 
The borrowing of local units and utility fi rms in the Republic of Croatia is gover-
ned by the Budget Law (NN 87/08) and the annual execution of the central gover-
nment budget of the Republic of Croatia laws. Local units can borrow by taking 
credit lines, loans and issuing bonds. Also laid down are individual and cumula-
tive (aggregate) limitations on borrowing by local units (table 4).
TABLE 4








restriction (% of 
operating revenue 




(fi nancing of capital 
projects)
30% of budgetary 
expenditures does not exist
1998-2002 20% of revenue made in 
the year preceding the 





Source: Author’s systematisation of data from Official Gazette (NN).
4 About 95% of the total amount of grants and subsidies to Zagrebački holding d.o.o. refers to subsidies from 
Zagreb city to Zagrebački električni tramvaj (ZET). In 2006 the city gave the right to subsidised transporta-
tion to sensitive groups (school children and students, the disabled, pensioners over 65 and families of dead 
patriotic war defenders), and via a contract to jointly finance passengers in mass transit guaranteed to cover 
the difference between the economic and the privileged price of ZET transportation. The criteria for subsi-
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450 According to the Budget Law (NN 87/08) a legal entity that is directly or indi-
rectly majority owned by a local unit and an establishment the founder of which 
is a local unit can take on long-term debt only for investment with the consent of 
the majority owner or founder. At the same time, the scope for possible borrowing 
by local units subject to budgetary constraints includes consents for:
•  borrowing of legal entities directly or indirectly owned by local units that in the 
annual fi nancial reports for the year preceding the year in which they have taken 
on debt have shown a loss;
•  the borrowing of legal entities directly or indirectly majority owned by a local 
unit that take on debt in the period of two years from the day of the entry of their 
foundation into a court register;
•  the borrowing of an establishment or institution the founder of which is a local 
unit.
The legislative provisions clearly show the possibility of the unlimited and unhinde-
red borrowing of utility fi rms on condition that in the year preceding the borrowing 
they did not make a loss and that more than two years has passed since the day of the 
entry of their founding in the court register. In the giving guarantees section, the 
provisions of the law nevertheless prevent imprudent behaviour and a local unit can 
give a guarantee to a directly or indirectly majority owned legal entity and an institu-
tion of which it is the founder for the legal entity or institution to meet its liabilities, 
but the guarantee issued must be included in the scope of the possible borrowing of 
a local unit. Table 5 shows the cumulative budgetary restriction and the annual 
amount of direct borrowing done by local units in given years.
TABLE 5
Budget constraints on the borrowing of local units in the years 2005-2010
(in million kuna)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Determined % of operating revenue 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Budgetary restriction 298 330 430 499 542 516
Annual amount of direct borrowing* 314 487 520 564 496 604
*The annual amount of direct borrowing represents the total sum of values of receipts from the 
sale of bonds and receipts from the borrowing of all local units in the given year. 
Source: Author’s calculation from figures from the financial reports of local units for 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.
Since local units have a limited ability to borrow, they borrow via the utility fi rms, 
thus sidestepping the budgetary constraints. The borrowing of fi rms of Zagrebački 
holding d.o.o. is a typical example of such a way of getting into debt. The cumula tive 
budgetary restriction on the borrowing of local units in 2007 came to 430 million 
kuna (table 5) and yet in the same year Zagrebački holding issued 300 million euro 
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451local public sector to borrow in that year. Although this kind of borrowing is legiti-
mate, for the operations of local units and utility fi rms are not formally connected, the 
repayment of the debt of the fi rm Zagrebački holding d.o.o. is in large part assisted 
by transfers from the budget of the city of Zagreb, as described in detail in the pre-
vious chapter. It is interesting to observe that the local units in all the observed years 
have taken on debt to an extent greater than allowed them by the budgetary restric-
tions. Only 2009 was an exception, but when the sum of 190 million kuna the utility 
fi rms borrowed was added to the debt incurred by the local units then the budgetary 
restriction was exceeded by 144 million kuna or 27%.
BOX 1
Accountancy aspects of the consolidation of fi nancial reports of local units
and companies they own 
The existing Budget Law (NN 87/08) formally does not require the composition of con-
solidated fi nancial accounts for local units and utility fi rms. Nevertheless, the accounting 
basis for the implementation of consolidation has been set up by International Public 
Sector Accounting Standards – IPSAS. A separate accounting standard (IPSAS 6), which 
mainly draws on International Accounting Standard (IAS) 27 prescribes the consolida-
tion of fi nancial reports and accounting for controlled entities. This standard relates to 
the preparation and presentation of consolidated fi nancial reports and accountancy of 
entities that are under the control of public sector institutions (excluding public sector 
companies). The standard prescribes the obligation to compose and present consolidated 
fi nancial reports in special reports of companies that have a controlling position. Although 
public sector companies do not need to harmonise their fi nancial reports to this standard 
(although they do have to harmonise them with international accounting standards, to 
which all companies are subject irrespective of whether they are in the private or the 
public sector), the provisions of these regulations are applied in cases when a public 
sector entity that is not a company (for example a local unit) controls one or more 
companies (for example utility fi rms) from the public sector. In this case, fi nancial re-
ports are consolidated in separate reports of the controlling entity. Control in the sense 
of this standard implies the power to manage the fi nancial and business policy of one 
entity by another entity in such a way that the controlling entity has some benefi t from 
the activity of the controlled entity. In addition, it is considered that there is also control 
in a case in which the controlled entity takes on debt with a guarantee from the control-
ling entity, which is particularly relevant for the identifi cation of control of local units 
over utility fi rms in Croatia. Consolidation is carried out not only by the stated condi-
tions being met but also by the items of fi nancial reports (assets, liabilities, capital, re-
venue and expenditure) of the controlled and control entity being aggregated, with the 
elimination of items prescribed by the standard.
The negative consequences of utility fi rm overload with debt do not relate only to 
the probability of the transformation of local unit latent into direct liabilities. Even 
much more minor consequences are considerable enough for the borrowing of 
utility fi rms to be addressed with particular caution. Utility fi rm insolvency can 
result in increased prices of local unit borrowing, because of the interconnections 
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452 more details in chapter fi ve). Although bodies of local units have no say when the 
fi nancial plans of the utility fi rms are being adopted, because of the interweaving 
of the operations of the local units and the utility fi rms, it is necessary to consider 
a united or consolidated fi nancial picture of the local units and the fi rms they own. 
This fact gains in importance in current economic conditions that threaten a rise in 
utility sector insolvency as well as politically unpopular measures of raising the 
prices of public services (Bajo and Primorac, 2010b). For these reasons it is neces-
sary as soon as possible to mandate the obligation to consolidate the fi nancial re-
ports of local units and their utility fi rms and to put the fi nancial planning of the 
fi rms within the jurisdiction of bodies of local units.
3 FINANCIAL POSITION OF LOCAL UNITS AND UTILITY FIRMS
The current fi nancial crisis has been refl ected in the operations of local units and 
companies they own. Aggregate revenues of local units were reduced from 25 bil-
lion kuna to 23.3 billion in 2009. In the same period expenditures remained un-
changed (25.3 billion kuna), which resulted in an increase in the defi cit from 
257,000 to almost 2 billion kuna, and in combination with the defi cit of the utility 
fi rms the defi cit of the consolidated local sector in 2009 came to 2.1 billion kuna.5
Financial operations. The ratio of current earnings and total earnings of consoli-
dated local sector (table 6) rose from 0.94 in 2008 to 0.96 in 2009. Since according 
5 Utility firms covered by the analysis in the context of the work include 159 companies that supplied the 
Financial Agency financial reports for 2008 and 2009. Some of the companies from Dubrovačko-neretva nska, 
Varaždinska, Splitsko-dalmatinska and Šibensko-kninska counties that were not available at the time this paper 
was written are excluded from the coverage.
GRAPH 1 
Financial operations of the local public sector of the Republic of Croatia 
(in billion kuna)
Source: Author, on the basis of the financial reports of local units and utility firms for 2008 and 2009.
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453to Schaeffer (2000) a value of this indicator greater than 0.65 is considered favou-
rable, the conclusion must arise that the structure of revenues of the consolidated 
local sector is, with respect to this indicator, appropriate. However, the indicator 
of net results that is the ratio of total expenditure and total revenue shows certain 
problems in operations caused on the whole by a reduction in revenue under the 
impact of the economic crisis. This is manifested in the rise of the value of this 
indicator from 1.01 to 1.06, where it is desirable that its value be lower than 0.95 
(Schaeffer, 2000). Invoking the reference values of the same source (<0.95 – fa-
vourable; >1 – unfavourable), the ratio of operating expenditures and current ear-
nings can be characterised as favourable, although the rise in this indicator from 
0.85 to 0.9 suggests the appearance of an unfavourable trend. For some categories 
of expenditure per capita there are no optimal or critical values, but it is logical 
that there should be an effort to minimise the values of these indicators. Although 
the total expenditures of local units per capita fell from 5,704 to 5,693 kuna, an 
increase in the expenditures of the utility fi rms resulted in an increase in the total 
per capita expenditures of the consolidated local sector from 7,848 kuna in 2008 
to 7,876 kuna in 2009. Accordingly, the operational expenditures of the consolida-
ted local sector rose from 6,278 kuna in 2008 to 6,434 kuna per capita in 2009.
TABLE 6
Financial operations of local units and utility fi rms
2008
Numerator Denominator Local units Utility fi rms Total
Current revenue Total revenue 0.74 0.95 0.94
Total expenditure Total revenue 1.01 1.00 1.01
Operating expenditure Total expenditure 0.74 0.95 0.80
Operating expenditure Current revenue 0.80 1.00 0.85
Total expenditure Population 5,704 2,144 7,848
Operating expenditure Population 4,235 2,043 6,278
2009
Current revenue Total revenue 0.96 0.96 0.96
Total expenditure Total revenue 1.08 1.01 1.06
Operating expenditure Total expenditure 0.77 0.94 0.82
Operating expenditure Current revenue 0.86 0.99 0.90
Total expenditure Population 5,693 2,182 7,876
Operating expenditure Population 4,374 2,060 6,434
Source: Author, on the basis of the financial reports of local units and utility firms for 2008 and 
2009, and data from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics concerning population estimates.
Solvency of the consolidated local sector in the period under observation (2008 
and 2009) is on the whole weakened because of the poor solvency position of the 
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454 cal units is good enough for it to be quite high even after consolidation. Although 
the ratio of current assets to short-term liabilities (table 7) for local units fell from 
8.41 to 6.87 (and from 428 to 2.76 for the consolidated local sector) these values 
are far greater than the 1 that Schaeffer (2000) gives as the critical value. From the 
aspect of control of fi nances the ratio of current assets and short-term liabilities 
greater than 1 shows the existing of net working capital and the fact that part of 
the current assets is fi nanced from long-term sources, which is line with the gol-
den rule of fi nancing.6 The ratio of money and short-term liabilities and money 
and current expenditure refl ects the measure in which a given entity is capable of 
fi nancing short term liabilities and current expenditure with the most liquid assets. 
The ratio of money and short-term liabilities of local units fell from 1.12 to 0.67; 
or from 0.52 to 0.36 for the consolidated local sector. This means that entities of 
the consolidated local sector in 2009 were on average able to meet 36% of short-
term liabilities almost instantly. By analogy, in 2009 the local units were in 2009 
able to meet about 13% of current expenditure with the most liquid assets, but the 
utility fi rms only about 5%, for which reason the ratio of money and current 
expenditures for the consolidated local sector comes to 0.1.
TABLE 7
Solvency of local units and utility fi rms
2008
Numerator Denominator Local units Utility fi rms Total
Current assets Short-term liabilities 8.41 1.48 4.28
Total surplus Current revenue -0.02 0.00 -0.01
Cash Short-term liabilities 1.12 0.11 0.52
Cash Current expenditure 0.18 0.05 0.14
2009
Current assets Short-term liabilities 6.87 1.16 3.76
Total surplus Current revenue -0.08 -0.01 -0.06
Cash Short-term liabilities 0.67 0.10 0.36
Cash Current expenditure 0.13 0.05 0.10
Source: Author, on the basis of financial reports of local units and utility firms for 2008 and 2009.
Below, the indebtedness of the local sector in 2008 and 2009 is analysed by a 
computation and interpretation of the most important fi nancial indicators.
The ratio of total annual debt servicing and current revenue (table 8) for the con-
solidated local sector was stable and in both years observed came to 0.03, a value 
of this coeffi cient less than 0.05 being considered satisfactory, while values grea-
6 The golden rule of financing says that fixed assets should be financed from long-term sources and current 
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455ter than 0.15 are unfavourable (Schaeffer, 2000). Although in 2009 the ratio for 
utility fi rms came to 0.82 – because of the smaller relative importance in the con-
solidated picture – the value of this indicator for the aggregate (consolidated) po-
sition of local units and utility fi rms came to a very good 0.04 in both of the years 
observed. 
TABLE 8
Indebtedness of local units and utility fi rms
2008
Numerator Denominator Local units Utility fi rms Total
Total annual 
repayment of debt
Current revenue 0.03 0.04 0.03
Total annual 
repayment of debt
Current fi nancial 
assets
0.03 0.21 0.04
Long-term debt Current revenue 0.11 0.94 0.34
Long-term debt Total revenue 0.08 0.89 0.32




Current revenue 0.02 0.05 0.03
Total annual 
repayment of debt
Current fi nancial 
assets
0.02 0.82 0.04
Long-term debt Current revenue 0.13 1.08 0.41
Long-term debt Total revenue 0.12 1.04 0.39
Long-term debt Total assets 0.04 0.23 0.10
Source: Author, on the basis of the financial reports of local units and utility firms for 2008 and 2009.
Burden of debt and burden of debt servicing. Although the fi nancial position, like 
the solvency and indebtedness of the consolidated local sector, is in relatively ac-
ceptable outlines, a negative effect of the consolidation of local units with the uti-
lity fi rms is perceptible in most of the fi nancial indicators observed. The situation 
is particularly bad in the context of the debt and the annual debt repayment that is 
a burden on every inhabitant of the given administrative and territorial unit.
The total direct per capita debt of local units (table 9) rose from 601 kuna in 2008 
to 652 kuna in 2009. The potential debt that covers guarantees and due outstan-
ding liabilities of local units rose in the period from 1,035 to 1,043 kuna and so the 
total (direct and indirect) debt of local units in 2009 reached the level of 1,694 
kuna per capita. If this debt is increased by potential liabilities that derive from the 
borrowings of the utility fi rms the total debt of consolidated local sector per ca pita 
in 2009 came to 3,277 kuna, with over 48% of the debt relating to the debt of the 
utility fi rms. In other words, if the whole debt of the consolidated local sector were 
to fall suddenly due for payment, every inhabitant of the Republic of Croatia 
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GRAPH 2
Per capita burden of the payment of the debts of local units and utility fi rms
(in kuna)
Source: Author, on the basis of the financial reports of local units and utility firms for 2008 and 
2009, and data from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics concerning population estimates.
Cities Municipalities Counties Total
consolidated










 2008    2009
TABLE 9 
Per capita burden of debts of local units and utility fi rms (in kuna)
No. Scope 2008 2009
  1 Cities 703 745
  2 Municipalities 193 219
  3 Counties 52 67
  4 Units of local and regional self-government* 601 652
  5 Active guarantees 751 590
  6 Due and outstanding liabilities 284 451
  7 Total contingent (5+6) 1,035 1,042
  8 Total (4+7) 1,636 1,694
  9 Utility fi rms 1,540 1,583
10 Total consolidated (8+9) 3,176 3,277
*This item is not the aggregate of debts of cities, municipalities and counties but an average 
value of the total unit of units of local and regional self-government per capita in the Republic 
of Croatia. 
Source: Author, on the basis of the financial reports of local units and utility firms for 2008 and 
2009, and data from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics concerning population estimates.
The burden of the total annual debt servicing of local units (graph 2) was reduced 
from 144 kuna in 2008 to 130 kuna per capita in 2009. The inhabitants of the cities 
were most burdened by total annual debt servicing in 2009, paying 142 kuna, and 
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457only 18 kuna. The trend for the burden of total annual repayment of debt of utility 
fi rms per capita to grow is cause for concern, increasing in 2009 (as compared 
with the previous year) by over 20%. The costs of the annual debt servicing of the 
consolidated local sector in 2009 came to 236 kuna per capita.
4 GROSS AND NET DEBT OF LOCAL UNITS AND UTILITY FIRMS
Local units in Croatia take on debt on the whole with credit arrangements with 
commercial banks on untransparent and unfavourable terms. The total direct debt 
of local units (table 10) rose from 2.7 billion kuna in 2008 to 2.9 billion kuna in 
2009, the share of loans in the total structure of the debt rising from 77.8% to 
79.3%. In the same period the state of active guarantees was reduced from 3.3 to 
2.6 billion kuna – which was compensated for by the rise in due outstanding liabi-
lities of 0.7 billion kuna and the total indirect debt held steady at the level of 4.6 
billion kuna. Also rising in the structure of direct liabilities of the utility fi rms was 
the share of loans, and the total debt of utility fi rms increased from 6.8 to 7 billion 
kuna, that is, from 2 to 2.1% of GDP. The total direct debt of local units and uti lity 
fi rms went up in the same period from 9.5 to 9.9 billion kuna and the total debt 
(direct and indirect) of the consolidated local sector in 2009 came to 14.5 billion 
kuna or 4.4% of GDP.
TABLE 10















































billion kn 0.6 2.1 2.7 3.3 1.3 4.6 7.3
% GDP 0.2 0.6 0.8 1 0.4 1.3 2.1
Utility fi rms
billion kn 2.4 4.4 6.8 6.8
% GDP 0.7 1.3 2 2
Consolidated
billion kn 3 6.5 9.5 3.3 1.3 4.6 14.1
% GDP 0.9 1.9 2.8 1 0.4 1.3 4.1
2009
Local units
billion kn 0.6 2.3 2.9 2.6 2 4.6 7.5
% GDP 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.6 1.4 2.3
Utility fi rms
billion kn 2.4 4.6 7 7
% GDP 0.7 1.4 2.1 2.1
Consolidated
billion kn 3 6.9 9.9 2.6 2 4.6 14.5
% GDP 0.9 2.1 3 0.8 0.6 1.4 4.4
Source: Author, on the basis of the financial reports of local unit and utility firms for 2008 and 2009.
Due outstanding liabilities of local units on the whole refer to liabilities for mate-
rial expenditure and liabilities for the procurement of non-fi nancial assets, while 
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TABLE 11
Debt of utility fi rms covered by local unit guarantees
Year Stock of active 
guarantees
(billion kuna)
Debt of utility fi rms
(billion kuna)
Amount of debt covered
by guarantees (%)*
2008 3.3 6.8 48.7
2009 2.6 7.0 37.3
*Probably not the entire amount of the guarantees of local units is meant for utility firms and so 
the values given need treating with caution.
Source: Author, on the basis of the financial reports of local units and utility firms for 2008 and 2009. 
TABLE 12






















































































Cities 2.3 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.0 2.2 0.6 1.6 0.1
Municipalities 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.7
Counties 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5
Total local units 4.0 2.4 0.9 0.7 0.0 2.7 0.6 2.1 1.4
Utility fi rms 2.4 0.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 6.8 2.4 4.4 -4.4
Total consolidated 6.4 2.9 2.8 0.7 0.1 9.5 3.0 6.5 -3.1
2009
Cities 1.6 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 2.3 0.6 1.7 -0.7
Municipalities 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4
Counties 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.5
Total local units 3.1 1.4 1.1 0.6 0.0 2.9 0.6 2.3 0.2
Utility fi rms 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 7.0 2.4 4.6 -5.9
Total consolidated 4.2 1.8 1.7 0.6 0.1 9.9 3.0 6.9 -5.7
Source: Author, on the basis of financial reports of local units and utility firms for 2008 and 2009.
ments of utility fi rms’ debts. By a view of the condition of active guarantees and 
debts of utility fi rms, it is possible to acquire an impression of the role of the gua-
rantees of local units in the borrowing of utility fi rms. 
A little less than half of the overall debt of the utility fi rms in 2008 was covered by 
guarantees of local units (table 11), while the share of debts collateralised with 
guarantees in 2009 was reduced to almost 37%. Guarantees of local units clearly 
have a very important role in the borrowing of utility fi rms. This additionally con-
fi rms the hypothesis about the pronounced interdependence in the operations of 
local units and utility fi rms, which steps up the need for formal consolidation of 
their fi nancial reports and a greater role of the bodies of local units in the fi nancial 
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459Net fi nancial assets are calculated as the difference between fi nancial assets and 
fi nancial liabilities (IMF, 2001) and are one of the relevant indicators of solvency 
(fi nancial health) of public sector entities. 
Financial assets of local units comprise cash in bank and in the treasury, deposits, 
loans given and securities, while fi nancial liabilities are liabilities for loans and for 
bonds. Net fi nancial assets of local units fell in 2009 from 2008 from 1.4 to 0.2 
billion kuna (table 12). The reason for this is the increased in liabilities for loans 
by 0.2 billion kuna with a simultaneous reduction of fi nancial assets by 0.9 billion 
kuna. Although the trend of the value of net fi nancial assets is downwards, positi-
ve values of this indicator do refl ect a satisfactory condition that is considerably 
changed by consolidation with the utility fi rms. Liabilities for loans of the utility 
fi rms increased in 2009 by 0.2 billion kuna with a simultaneous reduction in fi nan-
cial assets brought about by a drain of deposits amounting to 1.3 billion kuna. 
These changes in the fi nancial assets and liabilities of the utility fi rms resulted in 
a reduction of net fi nancial assets from -4.4 to -5.9 billion kuna, which by conso-
lidation with local units to a great extent spoils the idyllic image of the fi nancial 
position of the local public sector, the net fi nancial assets of which fell by 2.6 
billion kuna (from -3.1 to -5.7 billion kuna) in a mere year.
The existing condition of the net fi nancial assets of the utility fi rms is a threat to 
the fi nancial position of the local units that with subsidies and grants help the 
operations of the utility fi rms. The exposure of local units to the poor fi nancial 
operations of the utility fi rms has an effect on the credit risk of local units, which 
can ultimately refl ect negatively on their borrowing costs and in conditions of fi -
nancial instability of wider proportions also on the fi scal sustainability of the en-
tire local public sector. 
5  MARKET ASPECTS OF THE DEBTS OF LOCAL UNITS 
AND UTILITY FIRMS
The direct debt of Croatian local units is mainly unmarketable (table 10). Present 
in the fi nancial market are the municipal bonds of just 5 cities – Zadar, Split, Rijeka, 
Osijek and Vinkovci – the bonds of Zadar maturing in 2011, and those of Split, 
Vinkovci and Osijek maturing in 2017 at the latest (table 13). All issues are secured 
by the budgetary revenues of the cities, while the issued bonds are used to fi nance 
capital investment projects of communal infrastructure, education, culture and 
sport. In the context of the currency structure of the bonds issued it is practically 
incredible that 5 out of 7 issues are paid out in the kuna equivalent of amounts in 
euro. Since local units do not on the whole have revenues in euro, these characte-
ristics of the bonds issued indicate imprudent fi nancial management and poor plan-
ning of borrowing.7 The basic objective of local unit borrowing should be to ensu-
7 If local units were to earn a large part of their revenues in euro, then borrowing in euro – aiming to harmo-
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460 re the necessary fi nancial means with the minimum costs and as little exposure to 
risk as possible, not the making of profi ts by exchange rate fl uctuations. Taking on 
exchange rate risk in this way is entirely unfounded and future issues of municipal 
bonds should absolutely be denominated in the domestic currency.
TABLE 13










Zadar 18.5 EUR 103.08 20/8/2004 1/9/2011 5.50 Half-yearly
Split 2013 8.0 EUR 99.75 24/7/2006 24/7/2013 4.56 Half-yearly
Split 2015 8.1 EUR 99.19 27/11/2007 27/11/2015 4.75 Half-yearly
Split 2017 8.2 EUR 100.00 8/7/2008 8/7/2017 6.00 Half-yearly
Rijeka 24.6 EUR - 28/6/2006 18/7/2016 4.13 Half-yearly
Osijek 25.0 HRK 99.51 23/10/2007 30/10/2017 5.50 Half-yearly




300.0 EUR 99.32 3/7/2007 10/7/2017 5.50 Yearly
Source: Bloomberg, 2011.
The only “utility fi rm” bonds listed on the stock exchange are the already mentio-
ned ten-year corporate bonds of Zagrebački holding d.o.o. of  2007, nominal value 
300 million euro with an interest rate of 5.5%. The issue was sold on the interna-
tional fi nancial market at a discount (at a price of 99.32) and the purpose of the 
issue was to fi nance investment projects. Trade in this bond on the secondary 
market is very sporadic, but its price is a fairly good refl ection of major market 
trends and changes in assessment of the operations of the corporation (the debtor). 
Graph 3 shows yield to maturity on the bond of Zagrebački holding d.o.o. just 
before and during the fi nancial crisis.
Yield to maturity on bonds of Zagrebački holding in the period from July 9, 2007 
to January 21, 2011 ranged from 5.59% at the beginning of the period to a maxi-
mum of 10.96% in the third quarter of 2009. At the end of 2008, yield to maturity 
began to surge, which was to be expected because of the extent and depth of the 
crisis as well as the fact that on November 20, 2008, Moody’s cut the rating of the 
Holding from Baa2 to Baa3, and because of the strategic importance of the Hol-
ding in the operations of the city of Zagreb also cut the city’s rating from Baa1 to 
Baa2. A cut in the rating would certainly have been refl ected in the yield of the 
municipal bond if it had been listed on the fi nancial market, which would conside-
rably have increased the costs of borrowing for the city. This confi rms once again 
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461that imprudent fi nancial operations in the utility fi rms can to a great extent disturb 














































































NB: Bond yield to maturity is calculated on the basis of information about bond prices taken 
from Bloomberg. The bond was traded very seldom during the period, and the price made in the 
last transaction is taken for calculation of yield. Since bond yield to maturity depends on time to 
maturity as well, the lines on the graph between the moments of trading are not entirely horizontal, 
i.e. in periods when the price of the bond did not change the yield to maturity did gradually grow 
as a result of the approach of maturity date.
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of data from Bloomberg, 2011.
GRAPH 3 
Yield to maturity on the bond of Zagrebački holding d.o.o. (%)
6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Global fi nancial instability spurred an interest in the study of borrowing by corpo-
rates, households and public sector entities. Although local unit debt is often ne-
glected because of its seemingly small proportion of total state debt, the borrowing 
of local units is an essential segment of public sector borrowing. In the context of 
the management of local public debt, particular attention has to be devoted to the 
indirect (contingent) liabilities not only because of the uncertainty about their 
conversion into direct debt but also because of the seriousness of potential effects 
that the onset of such an occurrence might have.
Along with explicit, the public sector is often faced with implicit liabilities that 
derive from the borrowing of utility fi rms. Although the operations of local units 
and utility fi rms are formally distinct, local units often support the fi nancial ope-
rations of utility fi rms with subsidies, capital aid and indirectly by giving guaran-
tees. Similarly, by borrowing via their utilities, the local units can circumvent the 
budgetary constraints on borrowing prescribed by the Budget Law and the annual 
execution of the budget laws. For this reason the fi nancial operations of local units 
and utility fi rms must be looked at together in order to obtain an integral image of 
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462 be the consolidation of the reports of local units and the utility fi rms they own, but 
there is a good basis for such a procedure in IPSAS.
The fi nancial position of local units in 2008 and 2009 is acceptable, with slight 
signs of weakness brought about by deterioration of conditions in the economic 
environment. This picture is partially vitiated by consolidation with the utility 
fi rms, but because of the relatively good fi nancial position of local units (the credit 
going to fairly restrictive budgetary restrictions) the system is as a whole solvent 
and cannot be characterised as over-indebted. The burden of debt and debt servi-
cing is rising, and the situation of this kind is on the whole determined by the 
fairly high debt of the utility fi rms. The negative infl uence of consolidation is most 
visible in the stock of net fi nancial assets of the local sector that in 2009 came for 
the local units to 0.2 billion kuna but after consolidation with the utility fi rms 
turned into net liabilities as high as 5.7 billion kuna. The direct debt of local units 
is on the whole unmarketable, and only fi ve cities’ bonds are listed on the market. 
What is really remarkable is the currency structure of the bonds, which are on the 
whole denominated in euro. Considering the revenue structure of the issuing ci-
ties, there is no logical reason for such a currency structure. Yield to maturity of 
one utility bond (of Zagrebački holding) doubled after Moody’s had cut the Hol-
ding’s credit rating. Considering that the rating of the city was also cut because of 
the close connections between City and Holding operations, the conclusion has to 
be drawn that the fi nancial operations of utility fi rms can indirectly affect the costs 
of local government borrowing.
All of this indicates the necessity for the formal consolidation of the fi nancial re-
ports of local units and utility fi rms. In addition, the role of bodies of local units in 
the fi nancial planning of the fi rms should be enhanced, and any major borrowing 
by the utilities should be preceded by thoroughgoing analysis of the infl uence of 
the planned borrowing on the fi nancial operations of the company and also of the 
local unit in which it operates. It is necessary to bring in a system of assessing the 
credit risk of local units and utility fi rms with the aim of optimal allocation of 
consent for borrowing, and the assessment of credit risk should be the main deter-
minant in giving guarantees to local units and their utility fi rms. Finally, expan-
sion of the Fiscal Responsibility Law to fi rms in the public sector would certainly 
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